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PEÑA V. SIMEON, AND THE MEANING OF CONSENT
William Gaskins ∗
The Louisiana Civil Code states that contracts are formed by
consent established through offer and acceptance. But what exactly
is the consent that the offer and acceptance establish? This article
discusses the question with reference to Peña v. Simeon, 1 a
Louisiana case in which a woman with a poor understanding of
English is nonetheless held to have given her consent to an
English-language contract that she signed.
I. BACKGROUND
The facts of Peña v. Simeon are as follows: plaintiff Rosa
Peña went to USAgencies to buy an automobile insurance policy
for Fausto Justo, with whom she lived, and who was also the father
of her two children. Neither Peña nor Fausto spoke English very
well. Although Peña stated at trial that the insurance policy was for
Justo, who was in fact the principal “Insured” in the policy
document, both Fausto and Peña were listed on the policy as
“Covered Persons” and “Operators,” and Peña signed her name on
both pages of the document. Peña also signed her initials (Fausto
did not) next to the waiver paragraph that stated: “I do not want
UMBI coverage,” where UMBI refers to Uninsured Motorist
Bodily Injury coverage, which would provide compensation if an
uninsured driver caused an accident with the insured party. After
procuring the policy, Peña got into a car wreck, and then sought to
invoke UMBI coverage on the policy; USAgencies replied that she
had waived UMBI coverage, and that it therefore owed no UMBI
payments to her. Peña sued for those payments based on several

∗ J.D., D.C.L., Louisiana State University Law Center (2013). He would
like to thank Olivier Moréteau, Jennifer Lane, and Daniel On for their help.
1. Peña v. Simeon, 11-1083 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/22/12), 96 So. 3d 547.
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theories, and lost in a trial court pre-trial summary judgment in
favor of the other party.
II. DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEAL
In the appeal of the trial court’s summary judgment, Peña
essentially made two arguments: first, that she did not have
authority to reject the UMBI coverage; and second, that she could
not understand the contract because she did not have a very good
understanding of English. The court of appeal first treated the
question of whether someone with Peña’s relation to Fausto—
someone living with the principal “Insured,” and the mother of his
children, but not legally his wife—could waive all UMBI coverage
under an insurance policy. Louisiana has a strong public policy in
favor of finding UMBI coverage to exist even in doubtful cases. 2
However, citing a Louisiana law that says “any named insured in
the policy” can reject coverage, 3 and two cases that ruled a wife
could waive UMBI coverage on behalf of her husband, 4 the court
of appeal found that Peña had the right to waive UMBI coverage in
the insurance contract. As for the second issue, the court decided
that Peña’s weakness in the English language did not invalidate her
waiver of UMBI coverage for two reasons. First, the court
determined that there was no vice of consent, and thus Peña’s
consent to the waiver was not altered. Second, the court decided
that Peña sufficiently understood her rejection of the UMBI policy
because she knew the purpose of the visit to the insurer, because
she could read English well enough to recognize what the
insurance contract was, and because she signed the document.
Thus, the court found that she was bound by the waiver of UMBI
coverage.

2. Id. at 550.
3. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1295(1)(a)(i) (2009).
4. Bonnette v. Robles, 740 So. 2d 261 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1999); Tucker v.
Valentin, 807 So. 2d 292 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2001).
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III. COMMENTARY
The Court of Appeal’s decision as to whether someone of
Peña’s relationship to the principal insured and to the insurance
contract could validly waive UMBI coverage is straightforward
and needs no comment here. As for the second issue of the trial,
that concerning Peña’s understanding of the contract, there is more
reason for close inspection.
A. Vices of Consent
The court stated toward the end of its opinion that, “[Peña]
makes no claim of fraud, duress, or misconduct on the part of the
insurance agent.” 5 Here, the court seems to have had in mind the
vices of consent, which according to Louisiana Civil Code article
1948 are error, fraud, and duress. The court wrote explicitly that
there was no claim of the second two vices, fraud or duress, and in
fact it appears that neither vice existed in case. Misconduct seems
to fall under fraud or duress, but for whatever reason it is added to
the list. Oddly, there is no explicit mention of error. If the court
ignored the issue of error because Peña failed to plead it, this is
unfortunate for her. The Duong 6 case cited by the court decided
that, for purposes of an error analysis, “coverage for uninsured
motorist risk as statutorily provided is a ‘cause’ within the meaning
of La. C.C. art. 1949.” 7 Because error vitiates consent when the

5. Peña v. Simeon, 96 So. 3d at 552.
6. Duong v. Salas, 877 So. 2d 269.
7. Id. at 273. Duong did not state the exact reason for which coverage for
uninsured motorist risk is a cause, but the most likely reason is that it bears on
the nature of the law. Some potential ways in which error may concern cause are
listed in Louisiana Civil Code art. 1950:
Error may concern a cause when it bears on the nature of the contract,
or the thing that is the contractual object or a substantial quality of that
thing, or the person or the qualities of the other party, or the law, or any
other circumstance that the parties regarded, or should in good faith
have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.
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error concerns cause, 8 the Duong finding, that lack of UMBI
coverage is a cause, shows that Peña might have succeeded if she
had pled error. Perhaps if Peña had asserted the defense, the court
would have found that she too made an error as to cause when she
signed the UMBI waiver, although the fact that the court found her
mastery of English better than Duong’s makes it seem unlikely that
an error pleading would have yielded a different result from that
which she received. But even if the basis of a vice of consent did
exist, there is a more principal question, one that the court did not
directly discuss: did Peña consent to the contract in the first place?
To answer that question, consent must first be defined.
B. The Meaning of Consent
The Louisiana Civil Code says that, “A contract is formed
by the consent of the parties established through offer and
acceptance.” 9 Despite the importance of consent in the civil law of
contracts, the law refers to consent without ever defining it.
Louisiana Civil Code article 11 states that, “The words of a law
must be given their generally prevailing meaning.” What is the
generally prevailing meaning of consent? The obvious definition is
that consent means something like a manifestation of agreement;
and indeed, a reference to various dictionaries reveals that to be
so. 10 Similar definitions are “acquiescence,” “permission,”
“approval,” or “agreement” from Merriam Webster’s Dictionary, 11
with the latter three also given by Black’s Law Dictionary. 12
8. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1949: “Error vitiates consent only when it concerns a
cause without which the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause
was known or should have been known to the other party.”
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927.
10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 346 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 9th ed.
2009); LE PETIT ROBERT 371 (Paul Robert ed., 1983); OXFORD LATIN
DICTIONARY 412 (P.G.W. Glare et al. eds., 1968); 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 760-61 (Robert Burchfield ed., 2nd ed. 1991); WEBSTER’S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE ENCYCLOPEDIC EDITION
312 (Joseph Friend et al. ed., 1960).
11. WEBSTER’S, supra note 10, at 312.
12. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 346.
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Likewise, the Petit Robert’s translation of French consentement as
“acquiescence,” “agreement,” or “acceptance,” 13 tends to show
that consent means something like an outward manifestation of
agreement. And indeed, the fact that the method of showing
consent—that is, offer and acceptance—is an external
manifestation is made clearer by the following sentence: “Unless
the law prescribes a certain formality for the intended contract,
offer and acceptance may be made orally, in writing, or by action
or inaction that under the circumstances is clearly indicative of
consent.” 14 But there is also support for an opposite definition: that
consent is not an outward manifestation at all, but rather something
internal. The Oxford English Dictionary suggests consent may
mean “common feeling,” “sympathy,” or “accord.” 15 The CNRTL
French dictionary suggests for consentement something translating
to a “free act of thought,” 16 and the Oxford Latin Dictionary
suggests for consensus “concord” or “unanimity,” though also an
“agreement in action.” 17 From this subtle difference, it appears that
in its generally prevailing meaning, consent as outward
manifestation can be lexically separated from consent as an event
within the person who shows it, but that both meanings are present
in the common notion of consent.
From inward consent, a further distinction can be made. In
classical Latin, the verb sentire could mean both what we call “to
feel” and “to think.” Although it will seem odd to moderns,
Romans probably found there was no distinction to be needed
when they used the word, so that a translation of sentire sometimes
yields “to feel,” sometimes “to think”, and sometimes it is unclear

13. LE PETIT ROBERT, supra note 10, at 371.
14. Id.
15. 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 412.
16. CENTRE NATIONAL DE RESSOURCES TEXTUELLES ET LEXICALES,
http://www.cnrtl.fr/definition/consentement: «Acte libre de la pensée» (Jul. 8,
2013).
17. OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 10, 412.
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which is intended, or whether both meanings are present. 18 This is
vexing for the present purpose, as to feel oneself bound (which,
through reference to the word sententia may be better translated
here as a “will” or “desire” to be bound) 19 and to understand
exactly how one is bound are two very different things. It is here
that the word “unanimity” is a perfect translation of consent, 20 but
also an unhelpful one; for uni- corresponds to the idea of
togetherness like cum-, and animus and anima can mean either
mind or soul, just as sensus means either thought or feeling.
Altogether, if consent is to be taken with its full general meaning,
then it must be defined to include both a feeling or will to be
bound, and also an understanding of what one is bound to, for both
are included in the meaning of consent, just as the idea of external
manifestation is.
Can the different kinds of consent exist apart from one
another? It would seem that whenever an external manifestation of
consent is freely and intentionally (that is, not accidentally) given,
the person who consents must perform the external manifestation
as an effect of his internal feeling (here, “will” is a good substitute)
of consent. In other words, if the manifestation does not arise from
the will, nor is forced, nor is an accident, then how can it arise at
all? There must be some cause. But whereas consent of will is
necessary for a free and purposeful external manifestation of
consent, understanding can easily be shown not to be necessary for
it: one may sign a contract without reading it or otherwise learning
18. CLIVE STAPLES LEWIS, STUDIES IN WORDS 136-38 (Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1960).
19. See CHARLTON T. LEWIS, AN ELEMENTARY LATIN DICTIONARY 769
(Oxford Univ. Press, reprint 1999); see also ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 17 SUMMA
THEOLOGICAE 158-63 (Thomas Gilby O.P. ed. and English trans., 1970):
Although consent arises in the reason (and thus animals do not have consent),
consent is an appetitive power because it is an impulse to join oneself with an
object which can be felt when present. This appetitive power is the will
(voluntas). Thus the feeling element, the desire to move toward the object, may
be called will.
20. H.W. FOWLER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 105-6 (Sir
Ernest Gowers ed., 2nd ed. 1965); 3 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra
note 10, at 760-61; OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 10, at 412.
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of its terms. Thus, it appears to be a rule for the general meaning of
consent that where there is a free and purposeful external
manifestation of consent, the manifestation always arises from the
will; but understanding may or may not be present.
C. The Law of Consent and its Application to Peña
The law only explicitly requires the external manifestation
of consent, as seen in Civil Code article 1927, which speaks of
“offer,” “acceptance,” and various acceptable forms therefor. 21 If
the external manifestations of consent necessarily arise from the
internal will, then the law must also implicitly require that there be
consent of the will. As for consent in understanding, although the
Civil Code does not require it explicitly or even implicitly, the
Louisiana jurisprudence requires it. The Peña court states the
doctrine thus: “[i]t is well settled that a party who signs a written
instrument is presumed to know its contents.” 22 That is, if a party
gives an external manifestation of consent, then courts presume
that he also consents in understanding.
The reason for the presumption that consent in
understanding accompanies consent in manifestation is easy to see:
neither courts nor other people can see whether a party understands
a contract except by what he shows through his manifestations. If
one could not trust that another party’s manifestations of consent
were valid for a contract, then the formation of reliable contracts
would be impossible. But if there is only a presumption that
understanding accompanies the external manifestation, rather than
a strict rule that it does, then can the presumption in some
circumstances be overturned? And if so, when? The strong
language from some Louisiana jurisprudence makes it seem that
the presumption can never be overturned. Tweedel v. Brasseaux
states that, “The law of Louisiana is that one who signs an
21. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1927.
22. Peña v. Simeon, 96 So. 3d at 552.
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instrument without reading it has no complaint.” 23 Aguillard v.
Auction Management Corp. likewise states that, “It is well settled
that a party who signs a written instrument is presumed to know its
contents and cannot avoid its obligations by contending that he did
not read it, that he did not understand it, or that the other party
failed to explain it to him.” 24 Again in Coleman v. Jim Walter
Homes, Inc.:
Having signed this agreement, Mr. Coleman cannot seek to
avoid its obligations by contending that he did not read or
understand it. . . [T]he law does not compel people to read
or to inform themselves of the contents of instruments
which they may choose to sign, but, save in certain
exceptional cases, it holds them to the consequences. 25
The rule is strict; but there apparently are, according to
Coleman, unnamed exceptional situations. Tweedel also seems to
contradict itself by making an exception for rebuttal of the
presumption, saying that proof that a party was deceived can
overturn the presumption of understanding. 26
Probably a large majority of cases that involve
misunderstanding or mistake about a signed contract are cases of
error as a vice of consent. In the normal case, a party has consented
to enter a contract, but his understanding of some aspect of it is
deficient or wrong. If his lack of understanding is a designated
cause, 27 then the law regards the consent that he gave as vitiated
and made ineffective. But sometimes consent is more than merely
vitiated. Sometimes the parties are so far from agreeing with one
another that consent cannot be said to ever have existed at all, even
if the parties signed a contractual document. The problem in such a
situation is known in French doctrine as error obstacle, or error
resulting from an obstacle. Error obstacle is a radical
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d 133, 138 (La. 1983).
Aguillard v. Auction Management Corp., 908 So. 2d 1 (La. 2005).
Coleman v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 6 So. 3d 184 (La. 2009).
Tweedel v. Brasseaux, 433 So. 2d at 137.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1950, supra note 7.
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misunderstanding as to the nature or the cause of a contract. Even
though the parties seemed in many ways to agree, there was in fact
no actual meeting of the minds. There was no agreement
whatsoever because the parties “did not actually want the same
thing. An essential condition to the formation of the contract is
missing: the common intent, the true mutual understanding.” 28 In
such a case, it would not make sense to say that consent has been
vitiated, for there never was any consent except in appearance. Or
we may say that there was an external manifestation of consent,
but neither understanding of the terms nor any will to be bound to
the terms as they were. Under error obstacle theory, external
consent by itself is not enough to overcome a complete lack of will
to be bound, so that the parties are simply not bound.
If, as in Peña, a party signs his name to a contractual
document, but does not—or for the most part does not—
understand the language in which the contract is written, then is he
bound to the contract by law? Such a party manifests his consent to
the contract when he signs the document, and his free and
purposeful manifestation shows that he consents in will, too. As for
his understanding, there are three main possibilities: first, that he
does not understand the contested terms as printed, but that he
gains understanding of them through a translation from some
source outside of the contract; second, that he does not understand
the contested contractual terms at all; and third, that he has a
partial understanding of the contractual terms at issue. The first
situation occurred in Rizzo v. Ward, 29 a case in which a native
speaker of Spanish with below average ability in English signed
the UMBI waiver in an English-language insurance contract, but
discussed the document with an insurance agent in Spanish. Rizzo
pleaded in court that his waiver of UMBI coverage was void
28. FRANÇOIS TERRÉ ET AL., DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 216 (9th ed.,
Dalloz 2005); trans. in e-mail from Olivier Moréteau, Professor, Paul M. Hebert
Law Center, to author (April 24, 2013) (on file with author).
29. Rizzo v. Ward, 32 So. 3d 986 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2010).
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because he did not understand the contract. But the court cited the
presumption that parties understand the contracts that they sign,
and found that, while inability to understand the language might by
itself overturn the presumption of understanding, the fact that the
insurance agent explained the contract in Spanish counterweighed
his difficulty with English, so that the presumption was upheld.
The second situation occurred in the Duong case, in which a
Vietnamese man who spoke almost no English rejected UMBI
coverage in an insurance contract. Here, the party visited the
insurance agent with a friend who spoke more English, but even
the friend’s English was very bad. The court ruled that Duong’s
inability to understand the language of the contract was sufficient
reason to invalidate the contract. 30 However, unlike Rizzo, the
court turned to vice of consent, and found that the party had
consented, but that his consent was vitiated by an error concerning
cause. Although the Duong analysis seems to have reached the
right conclusion (for the party indeed had almost no understanding
of the details of his insurance contract), it is unfortunate that the
court does not discuss the issue of whether or not there was full
consent in the first place. And the third situation, that in which the
party had some understanding of the language of the contract, is
the one at issue in Peña v. Simeon.
In the present case, Peña externally manifested her consent
when she signed her initials by the waiver of UMBI coverage in
the insurance contract. At the same time, she must have consented
in will to be bound to the provision. As for the understanding
aspect of consent, the court concluded that Peña understood the
waiver because she knew she was at the insurance office to buy
insurance with Fausto, because she could read English well enough
to understand that the document was an insurance contract, and
because Peña signed her initials to the waiver. The first two of
these reasons make at best only a weak argument that Peña
30. Duong v. Salas, 877 So. 2d at 273.
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understood the waiver. The fact that Peña was at the office for the
purpose of buying insurance seems likelier to make Peña think the
waiver clause would provide insurance coverage rather than take it
away, and Peña’s ability to recognize the document as an insurance
contract was probably helped by her knowledge of the purpose of
her visit. But, importantly, Peña signed her initials next to the
UMBI waiver, and this signature created the presumption that she
understood the clause. After weighing the evidence regarding her
comprehension of the English language, the court found that the
facts were not sufficient to reverse the presumption of
understanding, and held that Peña consented to the waiver of
UMBI coverage. Peña signed the waiver, of her free accord, and,
by the unrebutted legal presumption, she understood the waiver;
thus her consent was whole and valid.
Given the facts as the court took them, the result in Peña is
the right one: for the law must presume that parties understand
their contracts, and Peña offered little evidence to prove that she
did not understand hers. Perhaps Louisiana could do more to make
sure that people with a poor comprehension of English understand
their contracts, both for their own sakes, and for the sakes of those
who contract with them. However, it is difficult to think of a
solution that would prove helpful in more than a few cases. One
example of such a rule helping non-English-speakers is
California’s policy that requires people who conduct business
primarily in one of the five foreign languages most-used in
California to offer the other party a translation of some types of
contracts into the language in which the contract was negotiated. 31
Such a rule would help a party like the one in Rizzo, who pleaded
in court that he did not understand his English UMBI waiver even
though the insurance agent discussed the contract with him in his
native language. But the law would not help the parties in Peña or
in Duong because their insurance agents discussed their contracts
31. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1632 (2011).
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only in English, and easily may not have spoken the parties’ native
languages of Spanish and Vietnamese, respectively. Furthermore,
requiring provision of full translations of contracts would likely
make the cost of contracting prohibitive for many people, and
would likely lead to many problems arising from inaccurate
translations. It may be true that a law requiring foreign language
translation of some contracts would help some parties, but the first
step is for Louisiana courts to clarify their doctrine of the
difference between the vices of consent and a total lack of consent
due to error obstacle. Only in so doing can Louisiana courts set
straight this basic aspect of the rights and duties of contracting
parties, both in cases of linguistic inability and elsewhere.
IV. CONCLUSION
Consent is necessary for all contracts under Louisiana law;
but the law does not define consent, and its subtler intentions must
be taken from its generally prevailing meaning. Consent contains
both an external and an internal element, with the internal
comprising both an idea of feeling or will and of knowing or
understanding. The Louisiana courts presume that parties
understand their contracts when they have manifested consent
through their signatures. The presumption of understanding has
been overturned on grounds of error in a case in which a party
knew no English whatsoever; but it would be better for courts to
find in such cases that lack of understanding, supported by enough
evidence to overturn the presumption, prevents full consent in the
first place. In Peña, where the party understood some English, the
presumption that she understood the provision was rightly upheld.
But Louisiana courts have yet to make clear their doctrine on the
distinction between vices of consent and the full lack thereof, and
cases involving linguistic inability will remain on unsteady ground
until they do.

